This paper provides an empirical examination of impact the 1994 FIFA World Cup in the United States on local employment. In contrast to ex ante economic impact reports that suggest large increases in employment due to the tournament, an ex post examination of employment in 9 host metropolitan areas finds no significant impact on employment from hosting World Cup games. Furthermore, an analysis of employment in specific sectors of the economy finds no impact from hosting games on employment in the leisure and hospitality and professional and business services sectors but a statistically significant negative impact on employment in the retail trade sector. JEL Classification Codes: L83, O18, R53, J21
Africa would have "a gross economic impact of $12 billion to the country"s economy" with 373,000 international visitors expected (Voigt, 2011) . Subsequent revisions placed the economic 2 impact at $7.5 billion along with 198,400 annual jobs (Rihlamvu, 2011) . Previous editions of the event elicited equally rosy predictions. The Dentsu Institute for Human Studies predicted impacts of $24.8 billion and $8.9 billion for Japan and South Korea, respectively, for the 1998 World Cup hosted jointly by the two countries in 2002 (Finer, 2002) . During the bidding process for the 2018 World Cup, the economics practice at AECOM predicted that a World Cup based in the U.S. would generate $5 billion for the country and generate 5,000 to 8,000 jobs in each of 12 potential host cities broadly matching the $4 billion the firm"s predecessor estimated for the previous World Cup held in 1994 in the U.S. (Slevison, 2009; Goodman and Stern 1994) . The 2006 World Cup in Germany elicited estimates of between $2 and $10 billion in increased income along with up to 10,000 additional jobs (Feddersen and Maennig, 2010) .
Of course, the expenses associated with hosting an event like the World Cup are also quite large, and the majority of the costs are typically borne by the host country. Indeed, it is only through passing along the major infrastructure costs that FIFA is able to manage to regularly amass its large surpluses. Just considering the sporting infrastructure, FIFA requires host countries to have at least 12 modern stadiums capable of seating at least 40,000 spectators with one of the stadiums being able to seat at least 80,000 for the opener and the final. Operating costs can also be quite expensive due to the extreme security measures that must be put in place. South Africa"s World Cup entailed $3.9 billion in expenses including at least $1.3 billion in stadium construction costs (Voigt, 2010; Baade and Matheson, 2011) . The 2002 World Cup required the construction of ten new stadiums in South Korea at a cost of almost $2 billion and another 10 new or refurbished stadiums in Japan at a cost of between $4 billion and $5.6 billion (Sloan, 2002) , while Germany followed in 2006 with 2.4 billion euros in construction costs of their own 3 (Baade and Matheson, 2011) . The 2018 and 2022 events in Russia and Qatar figure to be even more expensive due to the lack of existing facilities. Russian officials have stated that they are prepared to spend $10 billion on the tournament (Rianovosti, 2009 ) while Qatar"s bid is likely to be even more costly since it currently has only one stadium of the required size to host tournament matches. Given the enormous costs involved in hosting the tournament, it is reasonable to ask whether the predictions of economic windfall have come true in host countries.
Economists who have analyzed actual data related to the economic performance of host countries before, during, and after the World Cup have typically found identifiable benefits that are a fraction of those claimed by consultants their economic impact predictions. Using national data, Syzmanski (2002) finds that among the world"s largest economies, countries hosting the World Cup over the past 30 years experienced lower economic growth during World Cup years. Sterken (2006) also examines national data and instead finds a positive but very small impact from hosting the World Cup. Baade and Matheson (2004) were the first to undertake an ex post analysis of the economic effects of the World Cup using economic data from host cities (as opposed to countrywide data). They examine personal income growth in 13 metropolitan areas that either hosted World Cup games in the United States in 1994 or were directly adjacent to a host site. Their findings suggest that rather than a $4 billion windfall, host cities experienced personal income growth that was below that which normally would have been predicted by a total sum of $5.5 to $9.3 billion. Due to the size of the economies of the metropolitan areas involved, these estimates are subject to a wide degree of variability, but sensitivity analysis performed by Baade and Matheson predicts that economic gains in the cumulative range of $4 billion or more, as 4 suggested by the consultants, can be rejected at a 1% significance level, economic gains of $500 million or more can be rejected at a 5% significance level, and economic gains above zero dollars can be rejected with a p-value of 6.4%. Baade and Matheson (2004) , as well as other studies of mega-event analysis such as Coates and Humphreys (2002) , Porter (1999) , and Crompton (1995) reach similar conclusions:
although measurement of changes in net spending in the local economy as opposed to gross spending should be the goal of impact analysis, economic impact predictions almost invariably measure (and publicize) gross rather than net impacts. While major events like the World Cup attract large crowds that spend significant sums of money at the games, spending by local residents typically substitutes for spending elsewhere in the local economy. This results in an increase in gross spending on the event but no increase in net economic activity for the city or country as a whole as money is simply shifting from one sector to another. Even for out of town visitors net spending is lower than gross spending to mega-events if it displaces any regular tourists to the city who would rather not arrive during a mega-event. Finally, spectator sports and mega-events tend to be associated with particularly high levels of leakages so that the economic multipliers used in impact modeling tend to be unrealistically high (Matheson, 2009; Siegfried and Zimbalist, 2002) . Using a similar approach to Feddersen and Maennig (2010) and Baade, Engelhardt, and Matheson (2010) , this paper utilizes sectoral employment data in host cities and sample of control cities to reexamine the effects on local economies of the 1994 World Cup in the United
States. This analysis extends and improves upon the previous study of the 1994 World Cup by Baade and Matheson (2004) in several important ways. Most obviously, this paper examines employment and unemployment while the previous work looks at personal income. As noted previously, potential employment gains are often used to justify the public expenditures required to host the event.
The use of employment data has two more specific advantages over personal income or GDP data. First, employment data is available monthly, rather than quarterly or annually, for large metropolitan areas in the U.S. Identifying the economic impact of even a major event like the World Cup is akin to looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack, and the use of monthly data instead of less frequent data reduces the size of the haystack. In addition, the establishment survey provides employment data by industry type, further increasing the chances of finding the elusive "needle" as well as identifying potential winners and losers among sectors of the economy from hosting the tournament.
Data and Model
We use metropolitan statistical area employment data from the Current Employment Statistics (CES) and the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CES collects payroll data from 7 businesses, and has data for overall employment as well as employment in specific industries.
We use the overall employment data as well as employment in three industries: retail trade, professional and business services, and leisure and hospitality. The CPS surveys individuals and provides data on both employment and unemployment but does not have industry-specific data.
Each source provides monthly data on employment for several MSAs, including all nine of the hosts of the 1994 World Cup: Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, East Rutherford, Foxborough, Orlando, Pasadena, Stanford, and Washington, D.C. Some of these locations (East Rutherford, Foxborough, Pasadena, and Stanford) are too small to have employment data, but each is part of a larger MSA that is available in the data. Appendix 1 contains further details on the MSA specification for these cities in each data set.
We use the other large MSAs (at least 500,000 employed at the beginning of the sample frame) in the data to augment the control group for the World Cup hosts. We choose 500,000 since it is the nearest round number to the smallest MSA in the sample (Orlando). This restriction leaves a total of 44 MSAs in the CES data and 39 in the CPS data, where nine are World Cup hosts. Finally, our sample frame is January, 1990 to December, 2009. The CES and CPS provide earlier employment data but not for all of the hosts of the World Cup. We present summary statistics of these data at In response these results we transform the data using the percent change of employment (or unemployment. This transformation passes all three unit root tests above at a ten percent significance level. Another alternative is the first difference of the data, but we use percent changes here to put all of our MSAs, which have vastly different sizes, on a level playing field.
We also execute the test for autocorrelation within each panel as in Wooldridge (2002) which suggests AR terms are necessary in this model. This test estimates
. If the null hypothesis of 5 . 0    is not rejected, the model likely has autocorrelation. We reject this hypothesis using employment and unemployment levels, first differences, and percent changes.
Given the results of the unit root and autocorrelation tests, our model is now
where P is the number of lagged values or the autoregressive (AR) dimension of the model. We use trial-and-error to determine the optimal number of AR terms, and found that one lag is sufficient since higher-order lags are highly insignificant.
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Unfortunately, including an AR term in a fixed effects model biases the estimates. Since the use of fixed effects is equivalent to de-meaning the data by the MSA-specific means, a correlation is created between the de-meaned independent variables and the error term. Nickell (1981) demonstrates the amount of inconsistency is of order 1  T as N approaches infinity. This is a small number given we have monthly data over twenty years, although at N = 44 we cannot assume this asymptotic figure is accurate for our model. Kiviet (1995) proposes the estimating the amount of inconsistency and uses this result to adjust the estimates. This strategy requires estimation of two unobservable parameters: the autoregressive coefficient and the error variance. Fortunately, consistent estimates are available using the instrumental variable approaches of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) , Arellano and Bond (1991) , or Blundell and Bond (1998) . In addition, the standard error formula in the Kiviet (1995) strategy is asymptotic, so we use a bootstrap technique based on the normal distribution from Bruno (2005) . It is also plausible to estimate the model using any of the instrumental variable approaches mentioned above. We choose the Kiviet correction model based on favorable Monte Carlo comparisons (Judson and Owen, 1999; Bun and Kiviet, 2003; Bruno, 2005) and also because there is little difference in our main findings across these techniques. For comparison, we also present estimates of the AR model without the Kiviet correction. These estimations use maximum likelihood since least squares produces inconsistent estimates in AR settings. Finally, we use robust standard errors in all estimations since dynamic panels usually produce heteroskedasticity errors across MSAs. Table 2 presents estimates from three data sets (CPS employment, CPS unemployment, and CES employment) over several econometric specifications. None of the specifications 11 produce a statistically significant effect of hosting in any of the three data sets. In the CES data, the hosting effect on employment is positive in the four specifications, but the CPS data estimates a negative effect of a similar or even slightly higher magnitude is all four specifications. The CPS unemployment model provides two positive and two negative estimates.
All models that include a lagged dependent variable suggest this term has explanatory power, which is not surprising given the results of our autocorrelation tests. Finally, nearly all of the yearly and monthly dummy variables are statistically significant in every specification, suggesting MSAs are sensitive to national trends. Table 3 presents estimates from the CES sectoral data for three industries: leisure and hospitality, retail trade, and professional and business services. The only statistically significant results are in the retail trade estimations, which suggest that employment in retail trade decreased by 0.42 percentage points during the World Cup. At the average size of a World Cup host in 1994, this translates to a loss of roughly 750 retail trade jobs per month, or 1,500 total over the two-month long event. The retail trade estimation is also unique because the lagged dependent variable term has little or no explanatory power. While testing employment in the construction sector would also be of potential interest as a comparison to Feddersen and Maennig (2010) , data on construction employment were available only for a fraction of the cities in the sample (22 out of 44) , so this test was not undertaken. In addition, since no stadium construction occurred in the United States as a consequence of hosting the tournament, one would not expect public investment to crowd out private construction as potentially occurred in Gernmany in 2006.
Taken together, the results suggest either zero or perhaps negative employment effects of hosting. But even at our optimistic figure, the impact of hosting is small compared to the large economies that hosted World Cup games in 1994. Using the largest estimate (CES Kiviet corrected lagged dependent model) at the mean employment level for World Cup hosts in 1994, the effect translates to an increase in employment of about 0.1% or roughly 1,900 jobs for each World Cup host city per month. Since the World Cup lasted over two months for all but one city (Detroit, see Appendix), this represents an increase in employment of 3,800. However, the high standard error of this estimate produces a wide 95% confidence interval: -12,600 to 20,000.
Any inferences using non-statistically significant data should always be made with caution. Nevertheless, even this most optimistic point estimate of 3,800 jobs per city is less than the 5,000 to 8,000 jobs per city predicted by AECOM for the United States 2022 bid, although gains of 5,000 to 8,000 jobs cannot be rejected at normal levels of significance. Similarly, at the national average of approximately $60,000 GDP/worker in the U.S. in 1994, the roughly 34,000 jobs across 9 cities would result in about a $2 billion increase in national income, again roughly one-half the $4 billion predicted. These results are also broadly in line with other studies that compare ex ante predictions with ex post reality including Allmers and . All told, there is no evidence in the U.S. data during the 1994
World Cup to support a claim that the event will increase employment and economic activity at the levels suggested by event promoters.
Conclusions
It is often claimed that the World Cup is a golden opportunity for a country to showcase itself to the world while also generating a substantial economic return. Even the most optimistic estimates suggest that the employment and income gains from the tournament were roughly one-half that claimed by the event boosters. Furthermore, an analysis of sectoral labor data shows that even in the industry most likely to be affected by the tournament, leisure and hospitality, no increase in employment can be identified. Indeed, the only industry in which the World Cup appeared to have a statistically significant impact on employment was retail trade, and in this sector of the economy the effect was negative with the presence of the tournament associated with a fall in employment of roughly 1,500 jobs per city in the sector. This result is consistent with an hypothesis that local residents substituted spending on regular retail outlets for World Cup spending and that World Cup visitors crowded out other tourists who would have been more likely to spend money on retail trade.
The results in this paper further reaffirm the conclusions of other researchers who have examined the economic impact of mega-events, and we conclude that cities should be cautioned 14 from making expensive promises based on inflated predictions. From an employment standpoint, at least, the World Cup fails to live up to its billing as the world"s greatest sporting event, and the excitement on the field fails to translate into jobs in local economies. 
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